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ABSTRACT 
Background When German media theory (GMT) took shape in the early 1980s it was in-
fluenced by cybernetic concepts; however, it eventually discovered the history of cybernetics
as an object of research.
Analysis  The article follows the assumption that GMT’s double reference to cybernetics must
be characterized as the result of both a shared epistemology and a specific discursive constel-
lation. After contrasting McCulloch’s concept of a synthetic physiological a priori and Kittler’s
concept of a technological a priori it examines how GMT adopted concepts from cybernetics,
and how its members eventually became fascinated by the history of cybernetics.
Conclusion and implications  The article concludes that the double reference to cybernetics
explains its special role in GMT, while raising problems for GMT’s current fascination with
cybernetics.
Keywords  Cybernetics; Second order cybernetics; German media theory; Warren McCulloch;
Heinz von Foerster; Friedrich Kittler
RÉSUMÉ
Contexte  Quand elle a pris forme au début des années 80, la théorie médiatique allemande
(TMA) a été influencée par des concepts cybernétiques; plus tard, elle découvrirait l’histoire
de la cybernétique en tant qu’objet de recherche.
Analyse  Cet article suppose que ce double rapport à la cybernétique entretenu par la TMA
est le résultat d’une épistémologie partagée et d’une constellation discursive spécifique.
L’article, après avoir contrasté le concept d’a priori synthétique physiologique de McCulloch
avec celui d’a priori technologique de Kittler, examine comment la TMA a adopté des
concepts cybernétiques et comment les adhérents de celle-ci ont développé au fil du temps
une fascination pour l’histoire de la cybernétique.
Conclusion et implications  Cet article conclut qu’un double rapport à la cybernétique
explique le rôle spécial de celle-ci dans la TMA en même temps que ce rapport soulève des
difficultés en ce qui concerne la fascination actuelle de la TMA pour la cybernétique.
Mots clés  Cybernétique; Cybernétique de second ordre; Théorie médiatique allemande;
Warren McCulloch; Heinz von Foerster; Friedrich Kittler
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Introduction: Break out from the ghetto of the mind
However one defines feeling, perception, consciousness, substantial
knowledge—so the definition is infinite and unambiguous—each and all
are well within the tricky scope of circuitry. … Man-made machines are
not brains, but brains are a very ill-understood variety of computing
machines. Cybernetics has helped to pull down the wall between the great
world of physics and the ghetto of the mind. 
—McCulloch, 1989a, pp. 162–163
The media revolution of 1880, however, laid the groundwork for theories
and practices that no longer mistake information for spirit. Thought is
replaced by a Boolean algebra, and consciousness by the unconsciousness
… . And that the symbolic is called the world of the machine undermines
Man’s delusion of possessing a ‘quality’ called ‘consciousness,’ which
defines him as something other and better than a ‘calculating machine.’ 
—Kittler, 1999, pp. 16–17
Warren S. McCulloch and Friedrich A. Kittler share a remarkable commonality:
their scientific work can be described as a sort of exorcism. McCulloch (1989a), who is
arguably the most important founder of American cybernetics outside of Norbert
Wiener, turned against mentalist theories of the brain that took consciousness, feelings,
and other qualities of the mind for nonphysical phenomena that hovered in the head
“like bats [in] the belfry” (p. 158). McCulloch (1989a) wanted to expose these “ghosts”
(p. 158) as mere products of neuronal circuitry-operations. The literary scholar Friedrich
Kittler, whose work was instrumental for large parts of the German-speaking media
theory, also hunted for bats. Contrary to McCulloch, however, he did not expect to find
them in mentalist theories about the brain, but in the belfry of the German-speaking
humanities. According to Kittler (1980) these ghosts, for example, were called “history,
mind,” or plainly “man” (p. 8, author’s translation). Artificially kept alive for decades
by a humanist and hermeneutic tradition within German studies, they had to be “ex-
orcized” (p. 9, author’s translation) by means of poststructuralist theory. By examining
the material networks underlying these apparitions, both exorcists wanted to break
out from the ghetto of the mind and expel the bats of their own disciplines.
This article looks at the complicated relationship between cybernetics and German
media theory (GMT), starting with the programmatic proximity of their founders.1
There is no doubt that cybernetics plays a special role in GMT and that its influence
differs from the influence other schools of thought had on GMT, such as psychoanaly-
sis, post-structuralism, or the media theory of the Toronto school. Large parts of GMT
after Kittler have been directly informed by cybernetic concepts such as “feedback,”
“information,” or “recursion,” while at the same time many of its representatives have
chosen cybernetics as the central object of investigation regarding a media history of
the twentieth century. This double (or recursive, if you will) reference to cybernetics
as archive and object is perhaps the reason why GMT never ceases to be fascinated by
it: “something with media” turns into “something with cybernetics.”
Addressing the complex relationship between cybernetics and GMT goes beyond
simply exploring the impact of the history of ideas or the discursive influence of cy-
bernetics on GMT—or even a structural comparison of the two approaches. To better
understand the particular role cybernetics plays in GMT, this article argues that GMT’s
double reference to cybernetics must be characterized as the result of both a shared
epistemology and a specific discursive constellation around 1980. First the article takes
a closer look at the similarities and disparities between McCulloch and Kittler’s exor-
cism in particular, and cybernetics and GMT in general. It then examines the episte-
mological proximity of the key assumptions of cybernetics and GMT respectively: the
physiological and the technological a priori. Finally, it looks at how in the mid-1980s—
via the work of Heinz von Foerster (1985, 1992; von Foerster & Bröcker, 2002; von
Foerster & Glasensfeld, 1999; von Foerster & Pörksen, 1998) and other liminal figures—
cybernetics inscribed itself doubly in the nascent GMT as a theoretical offer as well as
the object of media-theoretical research.
Same but different
At first glance the similarities between McCulloch and Kittler’s research agendas are
striking indeed. McCulloch attempted to disprove mentalist explanations of human
consciousness by experimentally examining the material basis of thinking. From the
1930s to the 1960s he fought for his conviction regarding the biophysical explicability
of neuronal processes and was eager to “demystify knowing, as far as possible, and sep-
arate genuine mysteries from what is scientifically knowable” (Heims, 1991, p. 36).
McCulloch (1989a) argued that the “bats” (p. 158) he was hunting for—i.e., vociferous
nuisances such as “feeling, perception, consciousness” (p. 162)—had gone to the head
during the nineteenth century, after a nascent biology had successfully “exorcised”
(p. 158) them from the body. In order to finally eradicate them, he wanted to formulate
mechanical principles that would explain these “affairs called mental” (p. 158). The pri-
mary goal of Kittler (1990)—who adopted the perspective of discourse analysis of
“putting things in order” (pp. 371–372)—on the other hand was to rid his own discipline
of similar “timeless values” (Winthrop-Young, 2011, p. 22) and to expose the “discursive
regimes” (p. 51) that produced these values in the first place. Kittler (2012) no longer
wanted to ask the objects of German studies “what they meant, represented, reflected,
or criticized,” (p. 117, author’s translation) but instead wanted to examine texts on the
“level of their pure existence” (p. 117, author’s translation). He wanted to deconstruct
hermeneutic explanations of literary works by uncovering the discursive basis of their
analysis. In this respect, the materiality of neuronal networks from McCulloch’s exper-
imental epistemology corresponds with Kittler’s (1990) historically contingent “net-
works of technologies and institutions that allow a given culture to select, store and
process relevant data” (p. 369). While one network creates the false impression of a
consciousness free from material ties, the other produces the illusion of a coherent and
continuous speaking subject that appears to face us in poems and novels.
One could of course reply that the similarities between McCulloch and Kittler’s
exorcisms are merely superficial and confined to the goals of their respective research
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programs. After all, the two ghostbusters operated according to radically different meth-
ods (dissection, microscopy, and invasive electro stimulation versus discourse analysis)
and worked on entirely different objects of investigation (brain versus text).
Nevertheless, there are passages in Kittler’s texts in which his media theory comes sur-
prisingly close to McCulloch’s (1989b) “experimental epistemology” (p. 359). This ap-
plies to the Kittler’s (1990) “discourse network of 1900” (p. 117), for example, where
he diagnoses the disintegration of the “authority of production” (p. 186)—i.e., “the
mind”—in its psychophysical parts. Kittler argues that on the conditions of the new
media film, gramophone, and typewriter, these workings of the brain are no longer to
be understood as processes of a conscious mind but only as exclusively scientifically
describable operations (see Parrika & Feigelfeld, 2015). Later he even added that the
introduction of the computer, unifying these analogue media, would reinforce this sci-
entific understanding of the brain and lead to its interpretation as a calculating ma-
chine: “… everything is nothing but a modular device” (Kittler, 1993, p. 152, author’s
translation). That said, Kittler leaves his readers in the dark about the question of
whether this thesis is epistemological or ontological in nature: is Kittler identifying a
Foucauldian discourse formation, which is determined by media and could thus only
think of the brain as a calculating machine, or is the brain for him—just as for
McCulloch—nothing but a calculating machine, which only the media exposes as
such? The answer to this question bears consequences for the relation between cyber-
netics à la McCulloch and media theory à la Kittler: do we have to understand
McCulloch’s exorcism as part of the episteme that Kittler (1990) calls “discourse net-
work of 1900” (p. 117), or is the brisance of Kittler’s media theoretical exorcism ulti-
mately itself indebted to a “cybernetic way of thinking …” (Hörl & Hagner 2008, p. 17,
author’s translation) that has affected the humanities as well as the social sciences
during the second half of the twentieth century?
The programmatic proximity of their founders, however, is only one of many no-
ticeable commonalities shared by cybernetics and GMT and at least four more must
be mentioned here. First, they are both what Thomas Macho calls “temporary signa-
ture sciences” (cited in Pias, 2016, p. 15). They vehemently oppose the specialized dis-
ciplines of their time, subsequently fundamentally alter them, and finally are
threatened with being merged into them. Second, this order of critique, transformation,
and diffusion is in both cases based on a “universal, in any case meta-theoretical ap-
proach” and they both “promote terms and figures of thought with a wide and cross-
disciplinary applicability” (Bergermann, 2015, p. 48, author’s translation). Cybernetics
and GMT relocate the problems of other disciplines to a higher (or “lower,” depending
on the perspective) level of analysis and can thus be called “meta sciences.” At this,
both act as a kind of a “philosophy by other means” (Hayles, 1999, p. 95), inasmuch
as they seek to negotiate traditional questions of philosophy, such as the conditions,
possibilities, and limits of human cognition. Third, this universalism is expressed in
cybernetics as well as in media theory via an idiosyncratic and at times self-referential
terminology, which facilitates taking up this superordinate position when dealing with
the most disparate objects. Fourth, both discourses are research programs dominated
by men with a preference for technological clarification and a propensity to put ques-
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tions that are social, cultural, or philosophical in nature on their “media-technological
feet” (Winthrop-Young, 2011, p. 59).
Of course—and this must not go unmentioned—such a comparison from the per-
spective of the history of the sciences is a rather daring manoeuvre. On the one hand,
this is because equally fundamental antagonisms can be mentioned: while cybernetics
came out of the military-industrial-academic complex of American postwar sciences
(see Kline, 2015), GMT is first and foremost the result of a delayed reception of French
post-structuralism within the humanist enterprise in the Federal Republic of Germany
during the late 1970s that was thirsty for new theories. While the former constructed
actual machines in order to answer philosophical questions by other means, the praxis
of media theory—and even here, only in some exceptional cases—would be limited
to occasional programming, to some tinkering with soldering irons, or to dismantling
some old computers. And while cybernetics never achieved the ranks of an actual “dis-
cipline” in its country of origin, never founded any courses of study, and only survived
institutionally in the form of singular societies, GMT was taken by surprise in light of
its own success when it became a course of study for the masses and was internation-
ally recognized as a “Sonderweg,” or special path, in research (Breger, 2009). A large
percentage of students, who wanted to study “something with media” during the
1990s, found themselves in classes where texts from Kittler, Sybille Krämer, Bernhard
Siegert, and other representatives of GMT were canonized. Furthermore, what goes
for cybernetics as well as for media theory is that neither is a methodologically, insti-
tutionally, or programmatically coherent, distinct, and addressable construct. Both
were, or are, highly heterogeneous and in parts contradictory discourses that become
increasingly hard to grasp, the harder one tries.2 In spite of the dubiousness regarding
the history of science in reference to both cybernetics and GMT, this article neverthe-
less compares two key assumptions underlying McCulloch’s and Kittler’s exorcisms
respectively.
Physiological and technological a priori
The first central aspect of cybernetics’ role in GMT is the epistemological proximity of
their two key assumptions. Both research programs are informed by an apriorism that
is interested in those elements and factors of cognition that precede the production of
knowledge and are thus not immediately accessible to examination and reasoning.
On the one hand, there is McCulloch’s search for a “synthetic physiological a priori”
(Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch, & Pitts 1989, p. 253) of human knowledge, which even-
tually became one of the central research desiderata of cybernetics. His aim to exper-
imentally identify those structures of the human sensory system that decide on the
what and the how of human knowledge a prioriwas not just of interest to the neuro-
physiologists of the original cybernetics group but kept the cybernetic discourse with
its various branches busy well into the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, GMT works
hard on Kittler’s (1999) postulation of a “technological a priori” (p. 117), which at-
tempts to account for the technological mediatedness regarding all knowledge that
pertains to human cognition: “we knew nothing about our senses until media pro-
vided models and metaphors” (Kittler, 2010, p. 37). And it is commonly accepted that
the lowest common denominator of the numerous heterogeneous approaches of GMT
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may be brought down to this “media-apriorism … as … [the] initial problem”
(Winthrop-Young, 2008, p. 122, author’s translation).
Of course, the fact that cybernetics and GMT cultivate their own respective vari-
eties of a priori thinking is in itself not all that informative. The philosophical history
of the nineteenth and twentieth century is—in the wake of Immanuel Kant—rife with
apriorisms, and more than a few deem the question what it is that precedes cognition
to be the central and most important philosophical question since Plato (see Kompa,
Nimtz, & Suhm, 2009).3 But wherein consists the specific epistemological proximity
of physiological and technological a priori? Is there a certain property that distinguishes
them from the synthetic, empirical, material, dialectical, historical, economic, religious
(and many more) a prioris from the history of philosophy? In order to answer this
question, I will briefly outline the genesis of the cybernetic apriorism in order to sub-
sequently correlate it with the “technological a priori” of GMT.
Shortly after his studies in philosophy in New Haven and his subsequent med-
ical studies in New York, McCulloch’s assumption that neurophysiological research
practices and epistemological thought could be advantageously linked materialized.4 
During his psychiatric training at Rockland State Hospital for the Insane in nearby
Orangeburg, New York, McCulloch met the German neuropsychiatrist Eilhard von
Domarus and the American philosopher Filmer Stuart Cuckow Northrop in the early
1930s (see McCulloch, 1974). Both scientists encouraged him to investigate patho-
logical phenomena such as psychopathy from a logical-structural perspective and
not from a clinical one (see Abraham, 2016). Inspired by this new perspective,
McCulloch dedicated his future research to a question that had bothered him ever
since his student days: “What is a Number, that a Man May Know It, and a Man,
that he May Know a Number?” (McCulloch, 1989c). McCulloch hoped that by the
unified application of analytic philosophy and the experimental methods of neuro-
physiology, particular mechanisms in the brain could possibly be identified, which,
based on their structure, could be immediately linked with the cognitive operations
during calculating.
In the second half of the 1930s, McCulloch would continue on this way of coalesc-
ing neurophysiology and philosophy. Upon his return to Yale University in 1934, he
was able to deepen his experimental skills as an associate in the laboratory of neuro-
physiology of the Dutch physiologist Johannes Gregorius Dusser de Barenne. In nu-
merous experiments he dealt with the localization of specific areas of the brain in the
cortex and their attribution to certain physical functions (see Abraham, 2016).
Furthering his long-term objective—i.e., a scientifically substantiated epistemology—
was the idea of a physiological synthetic a priori, which he found in the work of the
German pharmacologist and physiologist Rudolf Magnus. Magnus, of whom he
learned thanks to Dusser De Barenne, argued that while Kant’s synthetic a priori “is
normally interpreted ‘philosophically-psychologically,’ that is, as an aspect of the psyche
… the a priori must also have a physiological basis” (Abraham, 2016, p. 60; see also R.
Magnus, 1930; O. Magnus, 2002). The possibility of such a corporally anchored filter
of cognition strengthened McCulloch’s feeling that he was on the right track with his
“search for a physiological substrate of knowledge” (McCulloch, 1989c, p. 1).
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A decisive enhancement to McCulloch’s apriorism occurred during the 1940s,
when the neurophysiologist—in his new capacity as a professor at the Illinois
Neuropsychiatric Institute of the University of Illinois in Chicago—met a group of
mathematical biologists led by the Ukrainian physicist Nicolas Rashevsky (see
Abraham, 2016). Rashevsky’s research project consisted of developing mathematical
models that would allow him to analyze psychological and neurological phenomena.
Rashevsky thought this abstracting approach to be imperative, since the objects in
the domain of biology (such as cells, neuronal networks, etc.) were essentially not
describable by man in their entirety. Due to their enormous complexity, mathematical
biology was supposedly dependent on “… highly idealized systems, which at first
may not even have any counterpart in real nature  …” (Rashevsky cited in Abraham,
2002, p. 16). In this approach, McCulloch recognized recognized the methodological
key to the unification of contemporary neurophysiology and Kantian idealism he
had hoped for.
Of peculiar interest to the epistemological proximity of McCulloch’s apriorism and
the technological a priori of GMT is the fact that McCulloch’s apriorism subsequently
made more and more recourses to technological concepts. This especially pertains to
his joint works with Walter Pitts, whom he met through Rashevsky’s entourage.
McCulloch and Pitts’ famous model of neural networks (see Arbib, 2000) constitutes
nothing more than the attempt to interconnect experimentally acquired insights re-
garding the neurophysiological structure of the brain with the formal logic of the
Turing machine (McCulloch & Pitts, 1989a). Their aim was to reveal the material pre-
conditions of thinking—albeit accessed by way of abstraction and idealization. As
chairman of the Macy Conferences from 1946–1953 (see Heims, 1991; Kline, 2015),
McCulloch was able to establish this neurophysiological-biophysical apriorism firmly
within that universal discipline called cybernetics. Together with Pitts, he would re-
peatedly return to classic epistemological questions that he wanted to coalesce with
the cybernetic approach (see McCulloch & Pitts, 1989b). By the end of the 1950s, this
development reached its preliminary climax at the Research Laboratory for Electronics
(RLE) of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Boston, where McCulloch
had transferred with some of his associates in 1951. As members of McCulloch’s re-
search team, the biologist Humberto Maturana and the neurologist Jerome Lettvin re-
searched the functional principles of the retina of the northern leopard frogs (Rana
pipiens) and concluded that the frog’s visual perception is determined by “a physio-
logical synthetic a priori” (Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch, & Pitts, 1989, p. 253), which
does not allow for any objective knowledge regarding an independent reality but, quite
the contrary, initially determines what “reality” is for the frog. On the way to this con-
clusion, at least Lettvin was heavily inspired by the application-oriented and militarily
demanded research work in the area of “pattern recognition” that his colleague and
friend Oliver Selfridge conducted (Lettvin, 1989, p. x).5 His search for a physiological a
priori of cognition was superimposed by a kind of machine thinking that let abstract
and idealized filters of cognition become “real” in the first place. “The retina,” follow-
ing Lettvin (1989), “is a machine, meaty and miraculous, but still a machine” (p. x).
This strategy of overlapping the physiological a prioriwith a mechanical a prioriwould
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decisively influence “second-wave cybernetics” (Hayles, 1999, p. 135), which will be
discussed below.
If one wants to connect this cybernetic merger of physiology and machine with
Kittler’s thesis regarding man as calculating machine quoted at the beginning of this
article, it has to be registered first that Kittler’s apriorism initially links with discourses
from the history of philosophy that are completely different from McCulloch’s cyber-
netics. Whereas McCulloch’s search for physiological proof of the Kantian a priori led
him to follow the “tradition of a priori philosophizing” that started with Plato, Kittler’s
technological a priori stands in the line of tradition of a “descriptive apriorism”
(Halbfass, 1971, p. 476, author’s translation) that originated in Edmund Husserl’s phe-
nomenology and that Kittler reached by way of the intensive influence of Foucault
(see Flynn, 2016). Instead of suspecting that the prerequisites and conditions of cog-
nition lie within the transcendental (or, as with McCulloch, neurophysiological) struc-
tures of individual consciousness, this form of apriorism searches for a historically
evolved and supra-individual formation that “in a given period, delimits in the totality
of experience a field of knowledge” (Foucault, 2007, p. 158). Kittlerian media-apriorism
is first and foremost an adaptation and continuation of this historicizing and decon-
structing apriorism, which was especially influential in French structuralism and post-
structuralism (see Ernst, 2015; Tuschling, 2016).
However, in addition to this heavily pronounced discourse-analytical side of
Kittler’s work, which examines the rules that govern the historical meaning of cogni-
tion, thinking, and language, there is another assumption in his media theory that
suggests that cognition, thinking, and language are in fact the operations of a bodily
machine. Accordingly, Kittler assumes a categorical compatibility of machine and
body—following Marshall McLuhan (2013)—based on which technological media
could be connected to our sensory organs. Even if Kittler inverts McLuhan’s media-an-
thropocentric thesis and speaks of an overpowering of the senses and organs by media
instead of the technological enhancement of man (see Mersch, 2006), McCulloch’s cy-
bernetic apriorism appears to have had an immediate impact on this aspect of Kittler’s
media theory. As is well known, McLuhan has been one of the authors who made the
cybernetic paradigm—“one in which material reality could be imagined as an infor-
mation system” (Turner, 2008, pp. 4–5)—accessible to the academic public and com-
patible with other theoretical discourses since the early 1950s. As a member of the
Explorations Group—a precursor to the Toronto School of Communication Theory
(see Darroch, 2008)—McLuhan had learned about Wiener’s cybernetics through mul-
tiple sources and had started a “conversation … with advocates of cybernetic theories,”
such as Wiener himself (Darroch & Marchessault 2016, pp. x–xi). At any rate, the su-
perposition of the physiological with mechanical conditions of knowledge constitutes
the core of the epistemological relationship between cybernetics and GMT. Both ap-
proaches postulate a compatibility of physiology and technology, and they derive a
fundamental material contingency (and, in the case of Kittler, manipulability) of
human cognition from it.
From second-order cybernetics to German media theory
Their epistemological proximity, however, is only one aspect of the special relationship
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between cybernetics and GMT. The fact that cybernetics was discovered as an object
of investigation by Kittler and his “students” during the 1980s and identified as a key
historical discourse for media history of twentieth century is every bit as important.
That this “rediscovery” of cybernetics did not happen accidentally, but on the contrary,
occurred due to a specific discursive constellation around 1980, will be shown in the
following section. One of the decisive liminal figures between cybernetics and media
theory is the Austrian physicist Heinz von Foerster, who was equally present in both
discourses and who consequently played a crucial role in sparking GMT’s interest in
cybernetics.
Once Foerster had immigrated to America in 1949, he had a chance to meet the
cyberneticists of the first generation around Wiener and McCulloch as a participant at
the Macy Conferences. During the 1950s, Foerster (1958), a professor of electrical engi-
neering at the Department for Electrical Engineering at the University of Illinois,
demonstrated an aptitude for research politics when he reformulated the cybernetic
program as the research of “biological computers” (p. 240). In doing so, Foerster was
oriented toward McCulloch’s physiological apriorism and wanted to focus on the con-
struction of “artificial sense organs for systems displaying artificial intelligence” (1958,
January 7). In this way, in 1957 he succeeded in convincing the mainly military research
sponsors of the idea to found a new and independently operating division at his de-
partment called the Biological Computer Laboratory (see Hutchinson, 2008; Mueller,
2007a). One of the machines built at this new laboratory was an artificial retina called
the “NumaRete,” which imitated the frog eye’s capability of “pattern recognition” (see
Müggenburg, 2016; Asaro 2007) as described by Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch and
Pitts (1989). During the period of growth in the first half of the 1960s, Foerster was
able to win over some of the protagonists of the early history of cybernetics, such as
the neuropsychiatrist Ross Ashby and the psychologist Gordon Pask, as either perma-
nent staff members or as visiting researchers for his new laboratory. Additionally, he
hired researchers, such as the German philosopher Gotthart Günther and the Chilean
biologist Humberto Maturana, who would only get to know cybernetics by way of their
research activity at the Biological Computer Laboratory, but who would later contribute
to cybernetics’ theoretical advancement (see Wilson, 1979). The research group was
completed by a heterogeneous group of PhD students who were fascinated by
Foerster’s transdisciplinary program and who were incorporated to a high degree in
the everyday research within the context of the funded projects (see Mueller, 2007a).
In order to be able to further finance his growing division, Foerster had to extend the
research program of his laboratory, and he had to convince his sponsors of cybernetics’
authority regarding contemporary research trends, such as “Artificial Intelligence
Research,” “self-organization research,” or “bionics” (see Kline, 2015; Müggenburg,
2014). Initially, he was able to rely on points of contact in Washington that were
favourably inclined toward him. Because of its involvement in conferences sponsored
by the military, the Biological Computer Laboratory developed into a well-connected
and renowned institute during the 1960s (Mueller, 2007a).
In the second half of the decade, however, it became increasingly difficult for
Foerster to keep the research funds flowing. Whereas in the early 1960s Foerster was
Müggenburg  Cybernetics and German Media Theory 475
still able to benefit from cybernetics’ reputation as an innovative and future-oriented
science, things changed when its momentum started to slow down and its universal
approach was increasingly called into question (see Kline, 2015). Competing research
perspectives, such as the symbolist approach within Artificial Intelligence Research,
edged cybernetics—which was still insisting on its neural approach—away from its
traditional areas of research and application. Additionally, Foerster was no longer able
to rely on the first generation of cybernetics that had supported him in founding his
laboratory. Changes of personnel in Washington, as well as a modification to funding
guidelines for military foundational research, caused Foerster’s well-established con-
nections with military research laboratories to gradually wither around 1970 (see
Mueller, 2007b). While the Biological Computer Laboratory thus had to struggle with
financial straits during the second half of the decade, its research focus also shifted:
away from the construction of electrical machines toward rather theoretically oriented
operations. In doing so, Foerster and his colleagues dealt more and more with social
problems, such as human language, and they were thinking along the lines of—usually
unsuccessful—project proposals dealing with societal fields of application for cyber-
netics in various areas (Mueller, 2007a). Small, student-organized projects and teaching
formats borne by the American counterculture were now characteristic for the labora-
tory and lead to controversies with the university administration (see Clarke, 2012).
Once Foerster had filed for retirement in the summer of 1974, his division at the
Department for Electrical Engineering was first phased out and finally liquidated in
1976 (Mueller, 2007b).
Accordingly, whereas the first years of the Biological Computer Laboratory were
characterized by designing machines, close proximity with the military-industrial-aca-
demic complex, and far-reaching independence from the department and the univer-
sity administration, the second half of the decade reveals “a departure from the
mainstream of research” (Mueller, 2007a, p. 288), decreasing support from
Washington, and an orientation toward teaching. However, from precisely this turbu-
lent late stage arose numerous writings that are nowadays commonly seen as the most
influential products of the research conducted at Foerster’s laboratory. Here, the het-
erogeneous strands of research, with Foerster’s theory of “second-order cybernetics”—
or, as he also used to call it, “cybernetics of cybernetics” (Scott, 2004, p. 1373)—on the
one hand and Maturana’s “biology of cognition” on the other (see Köck, 2015), merged
to become a transdisciplinary theory of cognition. The integration of the concept of
an “observer” into cybernetics would reach far beyond the end of the laboratory and
it would have an effect on various scientific and non-scientific fields, before finally
reaching Kittler and the GMT.
During the 1980s, Foerster periodically left his retirement home in Pescadero, CA,
to accept invitations to speak in Europe. This was mainly the case since numerous in-
fluential authors made his texts popular in the German-speaking discourses during
the first half of the decade, and since they consequently triggered a broad Foerster re-
ception within the context of postmodern theory construction. The philosopher and
family therapist Paul Watzlawick, for instance, would present Foerster’s work to a large
audience early on, thus establishing him as a central thinker of radical constructivism
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and of the nascent systemic therapy (see Levold, 2015; Watzlawick, 1981, 1985). Niklas
Luhmann (1984) also had a large influence on the Foerster reception, since he would
adopt numerous concepts of the latter for his sociological systems theory and since
he quoted the cyberneticist in his main work, Soziale Systeme,  multiple times and in
prominent positions (see Clarke, 2011). Probably the most important scientist with re-
gards to the reception of Foerster’s texts is the Germanist Siegfried J. Schmidt, who,
similar to Luhmann, was conversant with the texts of the second wave of cybernetics
since the early 1970s. By adapting the system-theoretical deliberations of Foerster and
others such as Maturana to his theory of communication, Schmidt (1987) accom-
plished for literature and communication studies that which Luhmann would simul-
taneously accomplish in the field of sociology. Furthermore, Schmidt—together with
the linguist Wolfram Karl Köck—was after translating and republishing essays central
to Foerster’s and Maturana’s works in various anthologies that had a high circulation
(see Foerster, 1985, 1992; Maturana, 1982). Within the context of this recirculation of
Foerster’s texts, he would eventually also be observed and discussed by the Berlin post-
modernists, who were thirsting for new theoretical trendsetters that could further their
discourse on media arts and media sciences (see Ars Electronica, 1988). The artist and
media theoretician Peter Weibel recommended the publication of an anthology with
Foerster’s autobiographical essays to the publisher Merve in the early 1990s. At least
since the publication of this book, called KybernEthik (Foerster 1993), the historiciza-
tion movement—to which Foerster would contribute over the course of the 1990s by
means of numerous interviews and recorded memories (see Foerster & Bröcker, 2002;
Foerster & Glasersfeld, 1999; Foerster & Pörksen 1998)—began. In the years 1991 and
1997, two commemorative publications (Watzlawick & Krieg, 1991; Müller, Müller, &
Stadler, 1997) as well as the republication of the Macy Conference protocols in 2003
by Claus Pias (2003) would further consolidate Foerster’s role as the German-speaking
witness to American cybernetics.
The historian of science Philipp Felsch recently gave an outline of the historical
milieu within which the “re-discovery” of cybernetics took place in the German-speak-
ing world (see Felsch, 2015): after the break with neo-Marxism and following the ero-
sion of structuralism, the German humanities were on the lookout for new role models
and propositions in theory. First, this search was characterized by the desire to think
beyond old established disciplines as well as literary canons and to finally overcome
the ideological turf wars. Second, there was an attempt at turning away from the “text”
and toward a dedication to material objects, scientific facts, and secrets from military
history: “Tinkerers are in demand,” writes Felsch (2015), “and kaleidoscopic thinking:
objects became more powerful than words” (pp. 166–167, author’s translation). With
some delay, French poststructuralism also broke ground and West Berlin entered the
age of postmodernism around 1980: “From Baudrillard to Benn, from Lyotard to
Gehlen, from Spengler to Kojéve all theoretical trendsetters that came into question
were surveyed” (Felsch, 2015, p. 190, author’s translation). Third, theoreticians of the
early 1980s used to maintain a “nimbus of hermeneutical knowledge” (Felsch, 2015,
p. 210, author’s translation). The new paradigm was, according to Felsch (2015), the
“figure of the initiated” (p. 207, author’s translation). In this way, one was devoting
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oneself to Paul Virilio (2006) and his search for the secret military roots of culture or
to Baudrillard’s (1983) fatalism. With that said, it does not come as a surprise that fi-
nally some of GMT’s representatives would realize that this new interdisciplinary and
scientific foundation of epistemological questions had already been raised by Foerster,
Wiener, McCulloch, and other cyberneticists some decades ago in the U.S.
In this academic milieu of disciplinary change and intellectual reorientation—
within which cybernetics was one of many “new” impulses—Kittler too grew aware
of the historical “universal science” of Wiener and McCulloch. And yet, as Moritz Hiller
(2016) recently worked out on the basis of Kittler’s literary remains in the German
Literature Archive in Marbach, it is hardly possible to make out one distinct influence
or first contact. It rather appears as if cybernetics gradually reached the literary scholar
over the course of many years and from different directions. At this, as Hiller (2016)
shows, an early implicit influence of cybernetics and information theory on Kittler’s
discourse analysis has to be differentiated from a later explicit appropriation of cyber-
netics as media theory: at first, Kittler received authors such as Watzlawick, Luhmann,
or Schmidt in the late 1970s, who—as outlined above—can be regarded as humanistic
importers of concepts such as second-order cybernetics. In his dissertation, for exam-
ple, Kittler (1977) quotes Watzlawick’s (1969) book Menschliche Kommunikation:
Formen, Störungen, Paradoxien, in which the latter discusses central cybernetic concepts
such as “feedback” and introduces the work of cyberneticists such as Gregory Bateson
or McCulloch. In fact, besides structuralism, poststructuralism, and other contempo-
rary discourses, “communication and media theory” is part of the “colorful conglom-
erate of new theoretical concepts,” (Hiller, 2016, p. 4, author’s translation) with which
German philology around 1980 had to deal. Kittler’s longstanding enthusiasm for elec-
trotechnical bricolages also had the effect that he would periodically draw on the “lan-
guage of telecommunications” in his manuscripts on Aufschreibesysteme (Kittler 1990),
which suggests that he must have been familiar with the practical side of control en-
gineering concepts as early as the late 1970s (Hiller, 2016). As Hiller (2016) thus shows,
in Kittler’s early work, linguistically transformed information theories à la Schmidt
met a rhetoric of telecommunication derived from his own tinkering experience.
However, neither of the two reached beyond the status of an “implicitly-unconscious”
affect (Hiller, 2016, p. 11, author’s translation).
During a guest stay in Stanford in the years 1982–1983, after the submission of
Kittler’s (1985) professional dissertation Aufschreibesysteme 1800/1900 and upon re-
ceiving a request by the reviewers for an explanatory introduction, Kittler’s implicit
influences from cybernetics and information theory became explicit. For the first time,
the literary scholar read texts by Claude Shannon deliberately and explained retro-
spectively that the way of looking at the problem in his professional dissertation was
“visibly characterized by media theory and cybernetics” (Kittler, 2012, p. 117, author’s
translation). What added to this conscious turn toward historical sources was not least
the reading matter of contemporary technico-historical works such as, for example,
the dissertation by the Berlin physicist and sociologist Friedrich-Wilhelm Hagemeyer.
On the basis of numerous interviews in the U.S. with Foerster, Shannon, and Donald
McKay, Hagemeyer (1979) reconstructed the history of information theory. Thus, what
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Kittler’s student Bernhard Siegert (2011) would later identify as a constitutive element
of a nascent media historiography, was also true for the beginning of Kittler’s exami-
nation of cybernetics: “Media histories were not written, media histories were found”
(p. 96, author’s translation).
In summary, in the mid-1980s cybernetics inscribed itself doubly in the nascent
GMT. On the one hand, cybernetic and information-theoretical concepts mediated by
McLuhan, Schmidt, Luhmann, and other authors were part of the many theoretical
offers against which or by means of which media theories around 1985 were estab-
lished. In this regard, one could say that GMT presupposes cybernetics. On the other
hand, the apprehension to get into view an important part of the history of one’s own
technological presence by means of cybernetics, lead to the fact that it became the ob-
ject of media-theoretical research. By continuously rewriting its history, many scholars
of media theory after Kittler have defined and are still defining what cybernetics was.
In this regard, one could also say that, as an object of investigation and ever-contro-
versial issue within media theoretical debates, cybernetics presupposes GMT.
Conclusion: Something with cybernetics
Ulrike Bergmann (2015) has recently suggested that the rediscovery of the history of
cybernetics by the first generation of GMT primarily contributed to rethink the “status
of technology in Media Studies” (p. 50). However, following Bergmann (2015), this his-
toricization was characterized by an “author-centric and partially heroizing” (pp. 50–
51) approximation to the newly discovered texts. Furthermore, the secret knowledge
of a “cybernetization” happening behind the back of history was well kept for many
years, and the legend of cybernetics as an “uber-science” (Kittler, Berz, Hauptmann, &
Roch, 2000, p. 332) was carried further. The representatives of the second generation
of media theory followed the first generation when it came to their enthusiasm, but
began at the same time to reflect on the historical context and the factual epistemolog-
ical effect of cybernetics.6 Accordingly, as Bergermann (2004) noted in an earlier article,
they “work out relations with ‘cybernetics’ that no longer focus on pioneers, but provide
and conduct theory-formation based on interdisciplinary material” (p. 10, author’s trans-
lation). This different understanding of cybernetics provides “a model folded in itself,
in order to conceptualize media/transmissions … it offers a connection to the field of
the history of science, offers epistemological prospects on medial possibility conditions
of knowledge as well as a history for the constitution of the digital” (Bergermann, 2004,
p. 10, author’s translation). But the second generation does also not seem to be able to
completely detach itself from the complicated relationship between cybernetics and
GMT. Along those lines, especially the two volumes published by Claus Pias (2003,
2004) on the Macy Conferences resemble the transformation of the second generation
on the fine line between enactment and re-enactment: the first volume enacts by pub-
lishing the conference protocols anew, thus reviving them as theoretical archive. The
second volume contains a number of secondary texts and archival materials as a stim-
ulus for a further historicization of cybernetic visions and concepts. And finally, there
is a third and even a fourth generation of German media theorists, who want to do
“something with cybernetics” in their M.A. theses or dissertations. Cybernetics has be-
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come a permanent issue within media studies and somehow it continues to create the
promising feeling of getting onto the track of our own episteme.
In light of GMT’s double reference on cybernetics outlined in this article, at least
three problems for this type of intellectual love of adventure arise. First, given the epis-
temological proximity between cybernetics and GMT and their discursive entangle-
ment around 1980 it appears that current debates within GMT and related areas of
media theory about cybernetics and its influence on contemporary science, society,
and culture (see Hansen & Clarke, 2011; Hörl, 2013) should pay more attention to their
own epistemological and discursive relatedness to it. First, future research work in this
area must first and foremost distinguish more carefully between cybernetics as a the-
oretical offer for media studies and as an object of research. Second, there is the risk
that GMT will continue to repeat the 1980s rediscovery of cybernetics as the key to a
media history of contemporary digital cultures. It is therefore important that GMT
should work to better understand the history of its own fascination with cybernetics.
Third, the epistemological and discursive interrelations between cybernetics and GMT
suggest that parts of GMT have prioritized cybernetics and neglected other important
factors of the multifaceted media history of the twentieth century. Only recently have
scholars of GMT and related fields of media studies started to pay attention to the hid-
den layers of media development. They are uncovering these layers by opening up to
other disciplines (Zielinski, 2013), by looking at non-Western cultures (Kusahara, 2011),
or by drastically expanding their period of research (Parikka, 2015). It seems that it is
finally time to “exorcize” cybernetics as a “timeless value” from the belfry of GMT.
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Notes
By using the term “German media theory”—as problematic as the label may be—I want to address1.
a major school of thought within German media studies that relies on Kittler’s approach and focuses
on the media technological conditions of culture (see Horn, 2007).
Regarding the “disunity of cybernetics,” see Ronald Kline (2015). On the other hand, Geoffrey2.
Winthrop-Young (2006) calls GMT a “motley crew of media-theoretical paradigms” (p. 89).
The circumstance that both approaches also direct this question regarding the conditions of knowl-3.
edge to themselves and their own practice of cognition as a last consequence (cybernetics to cybernet-
ics, or media to media science respectively) is not proof for a shared originality but is in the nature of
things: the existence of an a priori can itself only be postulated a priori and never a posteriori.
McCulloch’s philosophical training was largely influenced by his readings of Descartes’ physiological4.
studies, Leibniz’s (2014) Monadology, and Immanuel Kant’s (2009) Critique of Pure Reason. On
McCulloch’s philosophical training, see Michael Arbib (2000).
Maturana (2000) objected later; probably because he knew of the epistemologically problematic5.
implications regarding his collaboration with Lettvin: “When Jerry Lettvin states in the preface to the
second edition of McCulloch’s ‘The embodiments of the mind’ that our work on visual systems was
heavily influenced by Oliver Selfridge, he speaks for himself. Oliver Selfridge had no influence on me
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or my thought. I furthermore do not think that Oliver Selfridges thought had any impact on the work
that Lettvin and I did together” (p. 16, author’s translation).
When talking about the “generations” of GMT I am following Pias (2016) who compared the history6.
of GMT with the history of the Red Army Faction tongue-in-cheek.
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